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FLORIDA INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS

stantial investment in the land. Also, when the rights of third parties intervene,
there is an even greater degree of uncertainty in adjusting the parties' rights.
By adopting the mortgage approach, the courts may continue balancing the
equities on a case-by-case basis - a procedure that has assumed the form of
strict foreclosure - but only up to a certain point, beyond which forfeitures
would be disallowed. This approach is arguably subject to the usual criticisms
of inflexibility and arbitrariness. Nonetheless, such an approach would afford
attorneys and the public a reliable basis for planning and ensure a fair determination of the parties' respective rights. These attributes are particularly
important in today's difficult economic milieu, in which defaults are pervasive.
STEVEN ROBERT ROZYNES

THE CONDITIONAL LIABILITY RULE -A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A STILLBORN CHILD
A recent Pennsylvania case' has underlined the need to re-examine the requirement of survival in actions for the wrongful death of children in utero.
The illogic of continued adherence to the doctrine of conditional liability2 was
pointedly illustrated by the court's granting of letters of administration to the
estates of two infants of a set of triplets, while denying them to the third. All
three allegedly died as the result of prenatal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. While two survived birth for a few moments, the third was
stillborn.
A similar result may follow in Florida, based on the authority of Stokes v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.3 In that decision, a woman in her seventh month
of pregnancy suffered an automobile accident, followed several days later by a
stillbirth of the child. Alleging that the child's wrongful death resulted from
the negligent actions of the other motorist, the parents of the child proceeded
under the Wrongful Death of Minors Act, 4 asserting that the stillborn infant
was included within the statutory term "minor child."
Affirming the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful death action, the Florida supreme court held that a stillborn infant, although viable at the time of
the accident, is not a "minor child" within the statutory language of the
Wrongful Death of Minors Act.5 Declaring that the right of action for wrong1. The case is discussed in the Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Feb. 15, 1962, at 28, col. 5.
2. Under the conditional liability rule, a right of action for the wrongful death of a child
in utero can arise only after the live birth and subsequent death of the child. In jurisdictions
that adhere to the rule, an additional requirement exists that the child be viable at birth.
See cases cited in note 79 infra.
3. 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
4. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1971), superseded by FLA. STAT. §§768-16-.27 (1978). See notes 10-14
infra and accompanying text.
5. 213 So. 2d at 700.
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ful death could arise only after the live birth and subsequent death of the
child, the court repeatedly emphasized that it was not called upon to deter'
mine whether the stillborn child was a "person" under the general Wrongful
7
Death Statute. Stressing the unique language of the Wrongful Death of
Minors Act," the court refused even to consider the cases cited by the parents
9
allowing recovery for the death of a "person" in utero.
A recent change in the statutory language of Florida's wrongful death acts
appears to diminish the authority of Stokes and may require the supreme court
to reconsider the issue of whether a wrongful death action can be maintained
for the death of a stillborn child. On July 1, 1972, the new consolidated Florida Wrongful Death Act'0 superseded the Wrongful Death of Minors Act,"
Act" and created one general
the old Wrongful Death Act, 12 and the Survival
14
action for the wrongful death of any "person."'
Since the question of whether a fetus, viable at the time of injury, is a
"person" was expressly left open in Stokes,"s the issue of whether a tort action
can be maintained for the wrongful death of a child in utero remains unanswered.1 6 Moreover, any determination of whether a stillborn child was at one
rule17 and the
time a "person" will have to confront the conditional liability
8
merits of the burgeoning line of cases calling for its abolition.'
6.

Id. at 698.

7.

FLA. STAT.

§768.01 (1971), superseded by

FLA. STAT.

§§768.16-.27 (1973). See notes 10-14

infra and accompanying text.
8. 213 So. 2d at 700.
9. Id. at 699. The court in Stokes acknowledged that practically all the cases relied upon
by the petitioners turned on the viability of the fetus at the time of injury. Id. at 700. Although the issue of viability was eliminated as determinative in the instant case by stipulation
of the parties, the court declared that "the prior existence of viability does not affect the legal
status of the stillborn fetus." Id.

10.
11.
12.
13.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§§768.16-.27 (1973).
§768.03 (1971), superseded by FLA. STAT. §§768.16-.27 (1973).
§768.01 (1971), superseded by FLA. STAT. §§768.16-.27 (1973).
§45.11 (1965), as amended, FLA. STAT. §46.021 (1971), superseded by FLA.

§§768.16-.27 (1973). See Op. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. 074-100 (1974) as to whether the former
was totally superseded by the new Florida Wrongful Death Act.
14. "When the death of a peison is caused by the wrongful act. negligence, default, or
breach of contract or warranty of any person . . . and the event would have entitled the
person injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person . . . that would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable for
damages .. although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony." FLA. STAT.
§768.19 (1973) (emphasis added).
15. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
16. In a recent case, the First District Court of Appeal held that the term "person" in the
new wrongful death statute does not include a viable stillborn child. Davis v. Simpson, 313
So. 2d 796 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1975). Concluding there was no departure in the wording of the
new wrongful death statute from that of the old that would indicate an intent to create a new
right of action on behalf of a viable stillborn fetus, the court reasoned that the legislature
must have been aware, when it enacted the new statute, of the construction placed on the
old wrongful death act by the Stokes decision. Id. at 798. Had the legislature intended to
make a radical change in the law by granting a new right of action, the court felt it would
have done so in much clearer language. Id.
17. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
18. See note 78 infra. See also Note, The Case of the PrenatalInjury, 15 U. FLA. L. REy.

STAT.
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PrenatalVersus PostnatalWrongful Death Actions
Although the Stokes court did not deal directly with the merits of the conditional liability rule, several possible rationales for denying recovery were
briefly suggested:' 9 (1) the unborn child enjoys no legal personality in tort
under the common law and has no independent existence apart from the
mother; (2) the legislature did not intend an unborn child to be included
under the statutory language and any change in this area should be left to that
body, which possesses the traditional responsibility for creating new causes of
action; and (8) recovery would open avenues for fraud because of the speculative nature of proof, causation, and damages. In any event, the wrong is compensated if the mother recovers for her injuries. An additional argument advanced by other conditional liability jurisdictions to deny recovery is the lack
of emotional and financial burden on the parents should the child be born
20
dead.
The Unborn Child Enjoyed No Legal Personalityin Tort Under the
Common Law and HasNo IndependentExistence Until Birth
The initial reason for denying recovery in the conditional liability jurisdictions is that the child in utero is said to be part of the mother until birth, at
which time it becomes a "person" in the legal sense.2' Biologically, this legal
tenet is at war with current medical thinking, which holds that life begins at
conception. 2? While a close dependence exists between the unborn child and
the mother, the child in utero is not merely a part of her body.23 Moreover,
during a period in advance of parturition, the unborn child is capable of independent and separate life.24
Apart from biological considerations, the advocates of conditional liability
argue that the child in utero enjoyed no legal personality in tort under the
common law. Since children in utero were not considered complete legal per527 (1963), for an earlier, but dated, analysis of the action for the wrongful death of an unborn child in Florida.
19. 213 So. 2d at 699-700.
20. See, e.g., Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
21. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242 (1884);
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
22. "The foetus is certainly, if we speak physiologically, as much a living being immediately after conception, as it is at any other time before delivery." 1 T. BECK, MEDiCAL
JURISPRUDENcE 276 (l1th ed. 1860). See also A. MONTAGU, LirE BEFORE BIRTH 2 (1964); Gordon,
The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MxcH. L. REv. 579, 581 (1965); Kindregan, Eugenic Abortion, 6
SuFFoLK

L. REv. 405, 440 (1972).

23. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).
"[It is not disputed today that the mother and child are two separate and distinct entities;
that the unborn child has its own system of circulation of the blood separate and apart from
the mother; that there is no communication between the two circulatory systems; that the
heart beat of the child is not in time with that of the mother but is more rapid; that there
is no dependence by the child on the mother except for sustenance." Stemmer v. Kline, 26
A.2d 684, 687 (NJ. Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (Brogan, CJ., dissenting).
24. Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434, 439 (Miss. 1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 536, 458
P.2d 617, 622 (1969). See also PanagopovlqvS v. M[artin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 225 (S.D. W.Va.

1969).
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sons, 25 only when the child was subsequently born alive would a common law
action for prenatal injury be permitted. The argument states that since a statute allowing recovery for wrongful death is in derogation of the common law
and must be strictly construed, 2r courts should be reluctant, in the absence of
express statutory language, to allow recovery if the child is stillborn.
The surface appeal of the argument is enhanced by two recent Supreme
Court decisions: Roe v. Wade,2 7 which held that a fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and Burns v. Alcala,28 in
which, for purposes of eligibility for benefits under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Act, the term "dependent child" was interpreted not to
include unborn children.
At common law, no civil action could be maintained for the wrongful
death of any person.2 9 To allege that the child in utero enjoyed no common
law recognition in tort is to overlook related areas of the common law in
which the child in utero was the subject of state protection. The criminal law,
for example, proscribed abortion and assaut resulting in miscarriage. Similarly,
under property law, the child in utero could acquire certain property rights. 30
Thus, Blackstone stated in his Commentaries:
25. See, e.g., Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 49, 202 A.2d 9, 11 (1964). See generally Comment, Developments in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful Death, 69 DICKINSON L. REV. 258, 265
(1965).
26. See, e.g., McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Leccese v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1972).
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See note 28 infra.
28. 95 S. Ct. 1180 (1975). Neither Roe nor Burns prevents recovery for the wrongful death
of a stillborn child. Writing for the majority in Roe, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that
some states permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death
because of prenatal injuries. 410 U.S. at 162. As such an action appeared to be one to vindicate the parents' interest, he concluded that it would be consistent with the Court's holding
that the fetus represents, at most, the potentiality of life. Id. Moreover, the opinion admitted that even in the context of abortion, state regulation protective of fetal life after
viability has both logical and biological justifications. Id. at 163.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's opinion in Burns held that since the term "dependent
child" does not statutorily include unborn children, states receiving federal financial aid
under the AFDC program are not required to offer welfare benefits to pregnant women for
their unborn children. The Court did not declare that the states may not extend financial
assistance to the unborn under the program. 95 S. Ct. at 1187.
29. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 282, 149 So. 631, 632 (1933); Nolan
v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 597, 88 So. 601, 603 (1920); Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808);
Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (1677); Higgens v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1607). For a
broad treatment of common law principles preventing recovery of damages for bodily injury
resulting in death, see Smedley, Wrongful Death -Bases of the Common Law Rule, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 605 (1960).
30. "An infant in [sic] venlre sa mere . . . is supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyright estate made to it. It may
have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to
take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born." 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 129-30 (4th ed. 1771). Although the law of property recognized the rights of the
unborn child from the moment of conception for any purpose which accrued to its benefit,
retention of any benefit so acquired was conditioned upon live birth. See, Gordon, The Unborn Plaintifl, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579, 582 (1965); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, 46
NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 351-54 !1971).
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Life is the immediate gift of God... and it begins in contemplation of
law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if
a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in
her womb; or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by
the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. 31
Moreover, the child in utero was regarded as having a limited claim to life, as
evidenced by the rule staying the execution of a woman with child until after
32
its birth.
The Florida legislature has recognized the legal personality of an unborn
child by enacting abortion 3 3 and homicide3 4 statutes protecting the child in
utero from criminal invasion. Further, the right of a posthumous child to inherit from its parents is undisputed in Florida. The court in Shone v. Bellmore,35 which involved an unborn child's right to homestead property, adopted
Lord Hardwicke's view that by the rules of the common law and civil law a
child en ventre sa mere is to all intents and purposes a child as if born in the
father's lifetime.
The usual basis for rejecting the criminal law analogy is that the criminal
law protects a societal or public interest, while a civil action is purely personal
in nature. 30 If, however, criminal abortion and homicide statutes are enacted
for the protection of society, they must be predicated on the theory that a
"quick child" is sufficiently important to be entitled to protection.
[If] the wrongful act which constitutes a crime may constitute also a tort,
and if the law recognizes the separate existence of the unborn child sufficiently to punish the crime, it is difficult to see why it should not also
37
recognize its separate existence for the purpose of redressing the tort.
The logic of this position has the appeal of consistency, "a consideration which
ought to carry some weight in the making of judicial decisions."' 38 To allow a
wrongful death action where the child is injured and is subsequently born
alive, and yet to deny it where the child is killed and subsequently delivered
stillborn, produces the incongruous result of granting immunity to the tortfeasor whose negligence produced the severer consequences.
The assertion that, because it is in derogation of the common law, a wrongful death statute must be strictly construed is not supported by previous interpretations of Florida wrongful death statutes. Following the approach laid
31.

1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129-30 (4th ed. 1771) (emphasis added).

2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 412 (Dogherty ed. 1800).
33. FLA. STAT. §782.10 (1971). This statute was declared unconstitutional by the Florida
supreme court in State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972), as being vague, indefinite, and
uncertain. Abortion must now be punished as a common law offense.
34. "The willful killing of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such
child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed
manslaughter, a felony in the second degree .. " FLA. STAT. §782.09 (1973) (emphasis added).
35. 75 Fla. 515, 522, 78 So. 605, 607 (1918).
36. See, e.g., Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967).
37. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, 344 (1933).
3. Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 226 (S.D. W.Va. 1969).
32.
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down in Nolan v. Moore,39 the Supreme Court of Florida in Klepper v. Breslin
specifically rejected such a narrow construction of the Wrongful Death of
Minors Act, stating:
[We] point out that this is not a "survival of action" statute. The statute
creates a new cause of action, one unknown to the common law, which
arises out of the death of the child and gives full recognition to the
basic relationship between parent and child. Although the Florida act
is in derogation of the common law and because of this ordinarily
would be strictly construed, nevertheless we have held that it is remedial
in nature and should be accorded a liberal construction consistent with
the objective sought to be accomplished.4°
The LegislatureDid Not Intend To Include Unborn Children in the
Language of the Statute and It Is the Responsibility of
That Body To Change the Law
The intent of a valid statute may be ascertained by a consideration of the
purpose behind its enactment. 41 Section 768.17 of the new Florida Wrongful
Death Act states that it is "the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors to the wrongdoer." 42
Given the liberal approach of the Nolan and Klepper cases, and the declared
purpose of the wrongful death statute, it becomes increasingly difficult to see
how preclusion of a wrongful death action for the death of an unborn child
furthers that goal. If the conduct of tortfeasors in cases of prenatal and postnatal death is the same, the public policy of holding wrongdoers accountable
for their negligence appears to be thwarted by the conditional liability rule.
The court in Stokes interpreted the specific reference to the "quick child"
in the abortion statute and its omission in the civil action statute passed thirty
years later as an indication of a legislative intent to eliminate the stillborn infant from the "minor child" category of the Wrongful Death of Minors Act. 43
Assuming the validity of such an interpretation, the court will be hard pressed
to escape the application of its reasoning to the substitution of "person" for
the word "minor child." Since the former is much broader in meaning, a
strong argument can be made that the legislature was extending the right of
recovery to encompass situations where liability had not existed previously.
Further, it is difficult to state definitively that the legislature did not intend to include the unborn child as a "person" under the new consolidated
wrongful death action. 44 The Supreme Court of Indiana, in response to an
allegation of contrary legislative intent, replied that:
39. 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921).
40.

83 So. 2d 587, 592 (Fla. 1955) (emphasis added).

41. Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 597, 88 So. 601, 605 (1920).
42. FLA. STAT. §768.17 (197I).
43. 213 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1968).
44. The Florida legislature has, however, on at least two occasions, referred specifically in
statutory provisions to the unborn child. Florida's Workmen's Compensation Law expressly
provides that a "child" shall include a posthumous child. FLA. STAT. §440.02(13) (1973). Also,
Florida's trust accounting law defines an incompetent beneficiary to include an "unborn

person." FLA. STAT. §737.01 (1973). The lack of stch specificity in the new Florida Wrongful
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[We] find no objective reason for saying that the 1881 Legislature ...
did not intend "child" to include a stillborn child. Whatever was in
their minds is not recorded and is, at best, a matter of mere supposition. But if we may ... indulge in our own supposition it would be
this: That since actions for prenatal injuries and deaths were unknown
in... jurisprudence our lawmakers very probably gave no thought to
whether they were creating an action for prenatal injury or prenatal
death .... 45
To contend that the legislature, rather than the courts, is the proper vehicle
for creating the right of recovery is to ignore the fact that the conditional
liability rule is a judicial, not a legislative, creation. In Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores,4 6 the Alabama supreme court declared that to allow recovery for such
a wrongful death is not to usurp the legislative role. This decision did not,
reasoned the court, involve a confrontation with another branch of state gov7
ernment, but an effort at unity in order to promote the ends of justice.4
The Speculative Nature of Proof, Causation,and PecuniaryDamages
A major reason for denying recovery in the conditional liability jurisdictions is the difficulty of proving (1) the causal relationship between the injury
and the damage that ultimately resulted in death48 and (2) proving the pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss suffered by the parents and the future or potential
worth of the child.49 The latter problem is said to lead to sheer speculation.
Since there can be no evidence as to the child's potential capabilities, there
results a grant of damages, not to compensate the survivors, but rather to
punish the tortfeasor. 50 Moreover, it is argued that to allow recovery for such
claims would lead to a flood of fictitious and unfounded claims.51 Finally it is
Death Act could conceivably be interpreted as a legislative intent to exclude the unborn
child from coverage under the statute.
45. Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (Ind. 1972). See also Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101
N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
46. 300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974).
47.

Id.

48. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903-04, 301 N.Y.S.2d
65, 69 (1969).

49. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24
N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146
S.E.2d 425 (1966).
50. "[S]ince the mother may sue for any injury which she sustained in her own person,
including her suffering as a result of the stillbirth, and the father for the loss of her services
and consortium, an additional award to the 'distributees' of the foetus would give its parents
an unmerited bounty and would constitute not compensation to the injured but punishment
to the wrongdoer." Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 24& N.E.2d 901, 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d
65, 69 (1969).
51. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 310, 204 A.2d 140, 144-45 (1964). The same fear of
fictitious claims had led in Florida to the erection of the arbitrary barrier to recovery for
mentally induced injuries -the impact rule. The imagined impossibility of measuring mental
injury in terms of dollars was the basis of an early Florida decision requiring impact as a
predicate to recovery for mental injury. See International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla.

434, 14 So. 148 (1893).
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contended that the need for the action is more apparent than real since the
mother, in her own action for general damages, can recover virtually everything that could be recovered in an action for the death of the unborn child.52
The initial response to this argument is that the right to bring an action
must be distinguished from the ability to prove the facts. 53 The first cannot be
denied because the second may not exist. Moreover, such difficulty of proof is
not peculiar to an action for wrongful death. In any personal injury action the
plaintiff is required to trace the chain of causation between the injury and the
defendant's alleged misconduct. 54 The proof required to sustain an action for
wrongful death of an unborn child, in addition to showing tortious conduct,
would involve only three elements: (1) establishing an injury to the mother
brought about by the defendant's act; (2) showing that this injury caused the
harmful effects from which the child suffered and died; and (3) proving that
the child was capable of living independently of the womb. 55
While fetal death from the conduct of the tortfeasor may be established in
utero by several medical and biological tests, 50 the requirement of viability
would necessitate a showing that the child was capable of being delivered and
remaining alive separate from and independent of the mother. 57 There are
several criteria which can be applied to assess viability, and although an
opinion based on only one criterion would be of doubtful value, the concurrence of several would permit a confident and reliable medical opinion.58
"While individual variations are recognized, there is nevertheless a rather uniform relationship between the age of the unborn infant and a variety of
fundamental attributes, such as fetal weight, length, head dimensions, and appearance of ossification centers. 59
Although the medical proof in utero of causation and viability is difficult,60

52. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954);
Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69 (1969).
53. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d. 368, 372, 304 N.E.2d 88, 90 (1973).
54.

S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 32

(1966).

55. 9 AMi. JUR. PROOF Or FACTS, PrenatalInjuries 526, 545 (1963).
56. Fetal death may be established in utero by the following: cessation of uterine growth,
regression in uterine size, regression in size of maternal breasts, cessation of fetal movement,
absence of fetal heartbeat, disappearance of previously observed electrocardiogram, absence
of uterine bruit, x-ray of skull and spine, maceration of the fetal skin, and the mother's loss
of weight. 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 227, 242 (1974).

57. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 374, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (1973); Verkennes v. Corneia, 38 N.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Minn. 1949).
58. C. POLSON, THE ESSENTIALS OF FORENSIC MEDICINE 535 (3d ed. 1973).
59. 4B GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE §307.00 (1974). A necessary concomitant
of viability would be the maturity of the central nervous system, as extrauterine existence is
not possible until there is a sufficiently extensive surface area of the lung for gas exchange.
M. AVERY, THE LUNG AND ITS DISORDERS IN THE NEWBORN INFANT 5 (1964).
60. Although it is difficult to determine in utero precisely when the unborn child reaches
a status of maturity or viability, the presence of discernible calcification in the distal (lower)
end of the femur on x-ray examination is one of the best indications of maturity. The
visualization by x-ray of the upper end of the tibia and the head of the humerus are also
valuable guideposts. 5 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED
SPECIALTIES 372 (C. Frankel ed, 1960). Absolute certainty of viability can be achieved only if
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the problem of estimating financial loss from the wrongful death of a child is
virtually the same whether the infant is stillborn or is born alive and subsequently dies. There are basically two types of damages that can be recovered
under the new Wrongful Death Act:61 tangible - those damages which can be
estimated mathematically; and intangible - those damages based upon purely
emotional and speculative considerations. 62 Each survivor of the deceased may
recover the value of lost support and services from the date of the decedent's
injury to the date of his death and future loss of support and services from the
date of death, discounted to present value. 63 The parents may recover for
their mental pain and suffering from the date of injury. 64 Medical and funeral
65
expenses may also be recovered.
Obviously, in any case involving a stillbirth or an early death of a child,
damages will be difficult to ascertain. Notwithstanding this difficulty of proof,
however,'the court in Threets v. Hardison laid down the specific factors to be
considered in determining the loss of a minor child's prospective estate: (1)
the age and life expectancy of the child; (2) the age and health of its parents
and other relatives; (3)the child's intelligence, health, disposition, character,
mental and physical characteristics, and personality; (4) generally all evidence
contributing to a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the child as a total
being; (5) occupation and station in life of the parents, siblings, and relatives;
(6) intelligence and character of the parents; and (7) probabilities of education
and other opportunities to be afforded by the parents to the child.66
For the purpose of computing damages for the wrongful death of an unborn child, the only factors listed which might present some difficulty are those
in category three, having to do with the child's mental characteristics and
disposition. It should not be overlooked that these same problems exist where
the infant is born alive and subsequently dies, yet recovery is allowed.
Concerning the difficulty of calculating intangible damages, the Supreme
Court of Florida has acknowledged that the emotional suffering of a father
and mother over the loss of their child cannot be measured or weighed by any
tangible standard. 67 Yet the previous decisions of the court affirm the existence
of such intangible damages:
[M]ental pain and suffering of the parents directly, naturally, and necessarily result from the wrongful death of their minor child, and, the right
of the father to the minor child's services being infringed by the act of
the defendant, entitled the father to recover at least nominal, if not substantial damages for the loss of such services.68
the infant is born shortly after the injury. Arnold, Prenatal Injuries: A Treatment and
Prognosis of the Law, 18 DE PAUL L. RiEV. 439, 454 (1964).
61. FLA. STAT. §§768.16-.27 (1973).
62. Wilcox, The Computation of Damages Under the New Florida Wrongful Death Act,
26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 737, 740 (1972).
63. FLA. STAT. §768.21(1) (1973).
64. FLA. STAT. §768.21(4) (1973)."
65. FLA. STAT. §768.21(5) (1973).
66. 255 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1971).
67. Steele v. Miami Transit Co., 34 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 1948).
68. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 60 Fla. 186, 190, 53 So. 718, 719 (1910).
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While a mother's action has included damages for her own losses, it has
technically never included damages for the loss of the child. In Ephrem v.
Phillips,9 the court recognized a mother's personal injury action for a tortiously inflicted abortion of a previable unborn child. The court stated that
there was no claim made for damages that might have been sustained by reason
of the loss of the child. 70 Although evidence of increased pain and suffering as
the result of the abortion was deemed admissible, 7 nowhere did the court indicate that the mother would be recovering for the loss of the child - damages
72
that would have been allowed under the Wrongful Death of Minors Act.
A final argument advanced by jurisdictions adhering to the conditional
liability rule is that the same emotional and financial reasons for allowing recovery that exist where a child is born alive, but injured from a prenatal accident, are not present where the child is stillborn.73 In the former situation
the child is said to bear the mark of the defendant's wrong as a physical or
mental deformity, which could handicap him for the rest of his life and could
require him, his parents, or the state to expend considerable sums of money on
his behalf.

4

The responsibility of the parents is thus immeasurably extended

and broadened, and ultimately the child may become a charge of the community.
The underlying premise of this argument appears to be that there is no
emotional loss in the death of an unborn child and that damages are lessened
or significantly eliminated if the injury is inflicted and the child dies prior to
birth. The death of a minor child is a deep emotional injury.5 The child has
died whether the injury was inflicted at viability, after viability, at birth, or
subsequent to birth. If the purpose of a wrongful death action is to protect the
parents against tortious invasions of their right to the society and comfort of
their child, then to condition the right of action upon live birth seems unjustifiable.
The essential interest in both situations is the expectation of the parents.
While mental anguish and emotional stress on the part of the parents may be
greater in situations where they actually see the child before it dies, it is questionable whether the survival requirement reflects this distinction.76 "A rule
fixing survival as the determinant rather than viability has the appeal of sim'
plicity. It might aid the judiciary but hardly justice.""

69. 99 So. 2d 257 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
70. Id. at 260.
71. Id. at 261.
72. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1971), superseded by FLA. STAT. §§768.16-.27 (1973). See notes 10-14
supra and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24
N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9
(1964).
74. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 312, 204 A.2d 140, 146 (1964).
75. Comment, Damages for Death of a Minor Child, 18 NACCA L.J. 378 (1956).
76.

Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to PrenatalInjuries,

110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 556-57, n.17 (1962).
77. Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 362, 224 A.2d 406, 408 (1966).
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THE CONDITIONAL LIABILITY RULE
CONCLUSION

The previous observation of the Florida supreme court in Stokes v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. that there exists a number of equally strong and persuasive decisions denying recovery for the wrongful death of a viable unborn
child7s is of questionable validity since the weight of modem authority appears
to favor recovery for the wrongful death of the child in utero. Twenty-one
jurisdictions allow such an action79 while only thirteen, including Florida, continue to cling to the conditional liability rule.8 0 Furthermore, the trend is
78. 213 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla. 1968).
79. Jurisdictions allowing recovery for the wrongful death of a viable stillborn child and
appropriate statutory language: Alabama: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala.
1974), death of a "minor child"; Connecticut: Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 858, 224
A.2d 406 (1966), any action for injuries resulting in death; Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo &
Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956), death of a "person"; District of Columbia:
Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971), death of a "person"; Georgia:
Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955), death of a "child"; Illinois: Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973), death of a "person"; Indiana:
Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. 1972), death of a "child"; Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189
Kan. 143, 868 P.2d 1 (1962), death of a "person"; Kentucky: Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732
(Ky. 1970); Mitchell v. Crouch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955), death of a "person";
Louisiana: Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light, 50 So. 2d 847 (La. 1951), death of a "person"; Maryland: State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964), death of
a "person"; Michigan: O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971), death of a
"person"; Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corneia, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949), when death is
caused; Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954), death of any "person";
Nevada: White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969), death of a "person"; New Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957), death of the "deceased";
Ohio: Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), death of a "person";
Oregon: Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, rehearingdenied with opinion, 520 P.2d
361 (Ore. 1974), death of a "person"; South Carolina:Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d
75 (4th Cir. 1964); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964), death of a
"person"; West Virginia: Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W.Va. 1969);
Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W.Va. 1971), death of a "person"; Wisconsin: Kwaterski
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967), death of a "person."
80. Jurisdictions adhering to the conditional liability rule, allowing an action only if the
child is born alive, with appropriate statutory language: California: Boyer v. Suttle, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 95,
268 P.2d 178 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954), death of a "person," not a "minor child"; Florida: Stokes
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968), death of a "minor child"; Iowa: McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971), death of a "person"; Massachusetts:
Lecesse v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1972); Keyes v. Constr. Services Inc., 340 Mass.
633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960), death of a "person"; Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155
Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951), death of a "person"; New Jersey: Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J.
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964), death of a "person"; New York: Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d
478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969), death of a "decedent"; North Carolina: Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966), death of a "person"; Oklahoma: Padillow
v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953), death of
"one"; Pennsylvania: Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966);
Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964), whenever death should be occasioned by;
Tennessee: Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204
Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958), death of a "person"; Texas: Leal v. Pitts Sand & Gravel,
Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967), death of any "person"; Virgina: Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969), death of a "person."
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toward allowing recovery."'
Although the court in Stokes stated that the reasons suggested for denying
recovery had merit, 2 to continue to deny relief to the unborn child's representatives in a wrongful death action is not only harsh, but does obeisance to
an outmoded, timeworn fiction.8 3 The conditional liability rule yields the
absurd result that the greater the harm caused by the tortfeasor, the better the
chance of his immunity from liability.8

4

Because a family that loses a child

before birth suffers a great loss, it is only equitable that it should receive compensation from the tortfeasor whose negligence caused the loss. 85
If a fear of fictitious claims exists, the courts need only require that there
be strict proof that the negligence was the cause of the injury.8 6 If the difficulty
of estimating damages should continue to be an obstacle to recovery, the legislature could easily establish a fixed sum recovery or a maximum award under
3
the wrongful death statute.1
The solution to the problem is not to allow the tortfeasor whose negligence
results in the death of a viable unborn child to escape liability completely because his actions resulted in prenatal death rather than postnatal injury. The
conditional liability rule precluding recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child needs to be re-examined in light of the modern trend allowing recovery. In the words of Justice Musmanno:
It seems to me that it is a violation of the living spirit of the law to
adhere to an ancient rule which has no pragmatic application to the
realities of today. A precedent in law, in order to be binding, should
In addition to the 34 jurisdictions that have ruled definitively on the question of recovery, 2 other states have indirectly considered the issue. In Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706
(D.C. Alas. 1962), the court held there could be no recovery on behalf of a nonviable stillborn
child, implying that if the child were viable at the time of the injury, recovery might have
been permitted. Also, in Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965), recovery for the
wrongful death of a viable stillborn child was denied to the grandparents, uncles, and aunts
of the deceased on the ground that they could prove no pecuniary loss. However, the court
stated that if the action were brought by the father of the deceased, the question might be
different.
81. See notes 79-80 supra. Of the 24 jurisdictions that have wrongful death statutes containing the word "person," 15 have allowed recovery for the death of a stillborn child.
82. 213 So. 2d at 700.
83. Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 360, 224 A.2d 406, 407 (1966).
84. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1974).
85. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 148 N.W.2d 107, 111
(1967).
86. This requirement of strict causation would be to adopt the position taken by Louisiana in Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
87. While it appears that no state requires a fixed sum award, Rhode Island, for example, requires in wrongful death actions a minimum recovery of $5,000. R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §10-7-2 (1973). Wisconsin, on the other hand, established a maximum amount for loss
of the child's services, not to exceed $5,000 plus the pecuniary loss to the surviving parents.
Wis. STAT. §895.04 (1974). To adopt a minimum-maximum award under the wrongful death
act for the death of a stillborn child, viable at the time of the injury, would be merely to
further the same policy considerations that resulted in the imposition of a maximum ceiling
for tort claims against the sovereign under Florida's Tort Claim Act. FLA. STAT. §768.28(5)
(1973).
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